

FATWA DYNAMICS AND DOCTRINAL CONTROVERSIES: THE AHMADIYYA CASE IN INDONESIAN ISLAMIC DISCOURSE

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Abstract

This article examines the fatwas issued by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) regarding the Ahmadiyah movement in Indonesia. The research is motivated by the issuance of two MUI fatwas, in 1980 and 2005, stating that Ahmadiyah is heretical and outside Islam. The 1980 fatwa specifically issued a fatwa related to Qadiyani, while the 2005 fatwa covered both Qadiyani and Lahore. MUI fatwas are based on Quranic verses, hadith, and decisions of international Islamic bodies. The emergence of these two MUI fatwas illustrates the rejection and intense monitoring of the Ahmadiyah religious movement in Indonesia. Therefore, this study concludes that the factors of the emergence of two fatwas on Ahmadiyah are based on the influence of Rabithah through the Indonesian Da'wah Islamiyah Council (DDII), the recommendation of the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1979 to supervise Ahmadiyah and other deviant religious sects, the government's indecisiveness in dealing with the Qadiyani Ahmadiyah heresy, the emergence of unrest in the community, and the doctrine of Ahmadiyah Lahore which is in fact similar to Qadiyani. This research uses a qualitative approach and descriptive analysis method that relies on literature review.

Keywords: fatwa, MUI; ahmadiyya; prophethood

Abstrak

Artikel ini mengkaji fatwa-fatwa yang dikeluarkan oleh Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) mengenai gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia. Adanya penelitian ini dilatarbelakangi oleh penetapan dua fatwa MUI, pada tahun 1980 dan 2005, yang menyatakan bahwa Ahmadiyah adalah sesat dan berada di luar Islam. Fatwa tahun 1980 secara khusus mengeluarkan fatwa terkait Qadiyani, sementara fatwa tahun 2005 mencakup paham Qadiyani dan Lahore. Fatwa-fatwa MUI didasarkan pada ayat-ayat Al-Quran, hadis, dan keputusan-keputusan dari badan-badan Islam internasional. Kemunculan dua fatwa MUI ini menggambarkan penolakan dan pengawasan yang cukup intens akan gerakan keagamaan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia. Oleh karena itu, penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa faktor kemunculan dua fatwa tentang Ahmadiyah didasarkan pada pengaruh Rabithah melalui Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII), adanya rekomendasi dari Kementerian Agama RI pada tahun 1979 untuk mengawasi aliran Ahmadiyah dan aliran keagamaan yang menyimpang lainnya, ketidaktegasan pemerintah dalam menghadapi aliran sesat Ahmadiyah Qadiyani, munculnya keresahan di masyarakat, dan doktrin Ahmadiyah Lahore yang nyatanya serupa dengan Qadiyani. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dan metode analisis deskriptif yang bertumpu pada kajian pustaka.

Kata Kunci: fatwa; MUI; Ahmadiyah; kenabian

INTRODUCTION

There are 14 fatwas in the field of Akidah and Religious Sects, including the 1st fatwa on the issue of Jama'ah Khalifah and Bai'at, the 2nd fatwa on Islam Jama'ah, the 3rd fatwa on Ahmadiyya Qadiyani, the 4th fatwa on the denial of religion and the abuse of the proposition that it has "damaged the purity and stability of religious life", the 5th fatwa on mixed marriage, 6th fatwa on Shi'ah, 7th fatwa on sects that reject the Sunnah/Hadith of the Apostle, 8th fatwa on Darul Arqam, 9th fatwa on Archangel Jibril accompanying humans, 10th fatwa on terrorism, 11th fatwa on shamanism and fortune telling, 12th fatwa on pluralism, liberalism, secularism of Religion, 13th fatwa on Ahmadiyya sect, 14th fatwa on al-Qiyadah Islamiyah sect..¹

Among these 14 fatwas, there are issues that are discussed and issued twice, namely the 3rd and 13th fatwas. Both fatwas are related to the Ahmadiyya sect. The first fatwa ruled that the Qadiyani Ahmadiyya is a heretical and misleading sect. The fatwa was issued in 1980. Then, in 2005 MUI decided that not only the Qadiyani Ahmadiyya had deviated from the teachings of Islam, the Lahore Ahmadiyya was also a heretical sect.

The same phenomenon as Indonesia is similar in Pakistan. The debate over the existence of the Ahmadiyya has taken centre stage. This is because on the one hand the Ahmadiyya were prominent leaders of Indian Muslims and contributed to the leaders who formed the state of Pakistan. One such figure was Sir Zafarullah Khan, Pakistan's first foreign minister. On the other hand, the Ahmadiyya continued to face opposition from other leaders, such as Maulana Abul A'la Maududi. Maududi was able to convince the Ahmadiyya to be declared a non-Muslim group. Until 1974, a law was enacted claiming that the Ahmadiyya were non-Muslims.² The dynamics of the Ahmadiyah sect and its controversies are interesting to discuss in the Indonesian context. Therefore, this research tries to explore its history, development, and doctrine that led to the emergence of two MUI fatwas in 1980 and 2005. Before the MUI fatwa declared the Qadiyani Ahmadiyya heresy in 1980, the sect had already received a lot of rejection in the community. For example, Ahmad Sanusi (1889-1950), a Sundanese mufassir, had already responded to Qadiyani's ideology through his tafsir written in 1935, *Tafsir Tamshiyyah al-Muslimin*. According to him, the Ahmadiyya doctrine is so heretical and misleading that its adherents are considered infidels and apostates. Through the traces of this interpretation, the deviant ideology of Ahmadiyya Qadiyani since its inception in 1925 has received attention from the Muslim community. Therefore, it is not surprising that in 1980 this sect was finally designated as a sect that was not allowed to exist in Indonesia. However, it seems that the fatwa was not fully supported so that the spread and development of this sect actually disturbed the community. Public pressure and various reactions to the mushrooming Ahmadiyya understanding eventually became the consideration for the determination of the infidelity of the entire Ahmadiyya sect, both

¹ Dimiyati Sajari, "FATWA MUI TENTANG ALIRAN SESAT DI INDONESIA (1976-2010)," *MIQOT: Jurnal Ilmu-ilmu Keislaman* 39, no. 1 (June 9, 2015), <https://doi.org/10.30821/miqot.v39i1.38>.

² Osman, Mohamed Nawab Bin Mohamed, "Ahmadiyahs in Indonesia: Between Sensitivity and Diversity," *RSIS Commentaries*, no. 061 (2008), <https://hdl.handle.net/10356/82547>.

Qadiyani and Lahore in 2005. The dynamics and controversies are interesting to be discussed in order to capture information about the response of the community, the development and understanding as well as the background that motivates the emergence of MUI fatwa in 1980 and 2005.

METHODS

This research uses a qualitative approach that relies on library research. Through descriptive analysis, this research focuses on various literatures including articles, journals, books, and newspapers to reveal the history of Ahmadiyya's emergence in Indonesia, its movement and development, and MUI's response to this minority group. In addition, this research also analysed MUI's fatwa that appeared up to two rulings as an effort to validate the data presented. The data collection technique is through case study of Ahmadiyah fatwa and analysis of relevant literature. The accuracy of the knowledge derived from numerous literatures produced and examined with the MUI fatwa file directly must be ensured for the findings presented in this research to be considered valid.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

History and Profile of Ahmadiyya

Ahmadiyya was founded precisely in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad who came from the village of Qadian in Punjab, India.³ Ahmad himself was born in 1835 in Qadian and died in Srinagar in 1908.⁴ His educational background was law. He worked as a civil servant under the British government. His earliest writings dealt with the revitalisation of Islam within a modern framework. Then starting from 1882, he began to make claims on himself. In that year he claimed to be a mujaddid or reformer of Islam. Later in 1891, he declared several claims. Among them were that he was an avatar of Krishna, Jesus sent down to earth and a prophet sent without scripture.⁵

According to Fathoni, the Ahmadiyya movement emerged as a counter protest against the decline of Islam in the 19th century. Basically, this sect intends to get non-Muslims interested in the teachings of Islam.⁶ Despite its aims, according to Melissa Crouch, the sect has been met with resistance from mainstream Muslims since its inception in the 1880s until its split into two sects.⁷ This opinion differs from Maftuh Basyuni's view that there were

³ Osman, Mohamed Nawab Bin Mohamed.

⁴ Sadia Saeed, "Pakistani Nationalism and the State Marginalisation of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 7, no. 3 (December 2007): 132–52, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-9469.2007.tb00166.x>.

⁵ Mohamad Atqa, "RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN INDONESIA" 1 (2010).

⁶ Such resistance includes the issuing of fatwas in India and in Pakistan. Atqa.

⁷ Melissa Crouch, "Indonesia, Militant Islam and Ahmadiyah: Origins and Implications," *Islam, Syari'ah and Governance Background Paper Series*, 2009.

actually no problems and disputes before Mirza Ghulam Ahmad died.⁸ If seen from some literature, indeed the problems related to Ahmadiyah are increasingly coming to the surface. It has even become a discussion to issue various fatwas in Muslim countries since the split of Ahmadiyya into two groups.

The split of the Ahmadiyya sect into two groups occurred after the death of Ahmad's first successor, Hakim Nuruddin. The main issue in the schism was the prophetic claims of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. The first group, the Qadiyani, believed that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet. The other group, the Lahoreans, did not accept Ahmad's claim of prophethood. They insisted that Ahmad was a mujaddid, or Islamic reformer. The sect was led by Muhammad Ali in 1914 in Pakistan.⁹

Historically, Ahmadiyya missions to African and Asian countries began in the 1920s. In some literature, Ahmadiyya entered Indonesia precisely in 1925. There are also those who say in 1924. This was revealed by Ismatu Ropi in his article. In that year, Ahmadiyah Lahore or known as the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Movement (GAI) first entered Indonesia, which is precisely on the island of Java, Yogyakarta.¹⁰

Unlike the Lahore Ahmadiyya, the Qadiyani sect or Jamaah Ahmadiyya Indonesia (JAI) entered Indonesia for the first time through Aceh. Precisely in October 1925, Rahmat Ali was sent by the second caliph, Mirza Bashiruddin Ahmad, to fulfil the invitation of Indonesian students studying in Qadian.

In 1953, Ahmadiyya gained official recognition from the Indonesian government as a religious sect.¹¹ Currently, Ahmadiyah claims to have more than 300,000 to 400,000 members, while the Ministry of Religious Affairs estimates Ahmadiyah followers in Indonesia at around 50,000 to 80,000. However, even if the number is up to 400,000, it is still relatively small in the context of a Muslim population of 240 million.¹² The acknowledgement invited disapproval from many parties because the doctrine brought by Ahmadiyya, especially the Qadiyani Ahmadiyya, was considered to have deviated from Islamic teachings.

Ahmadiyya Doctrine

The doctrine believed by the Qadiyani Ahmadiyya is different from that of Lahore. The difference is related to the position of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in the Ahmadiyya sect.

⁸ Maftuh Basyuni, "Sebelum Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Wafat, Tidak Ada Persoalan," *Tempo*, February 26, 2006.

⁹ Maulana, Muhammad Hafiz Sher, *True Fact about the Ahmadiyya Movement* (Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishaat Islam, n.d.).

¹⁰ Ismatu Ropi, "Islamism, Government Regulation, and the Ahmadiyah Controversies in Indonesia," *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 48, no. 2 (December 18, 2010): 281–320, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2010.482.281-320>.

¹¹ Avonius, Leena, "The Ahmadiyya & Freedom of Religion in Indonesia," *Isim Review* 22, no. 1 (2008), <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/17263>.

¹² Crouch, "Indonesia, Militant Islam and Ahmadiyah: Origins and Implications."

Qadiyani believes that Ahmad is a prophet. Based on Saeful Uyun's explanation, the Qadiyani leader of NTB Province claims that Ahmad is a zili prophet. Prophet zili is a symbolic prophethood in which Ahmad is a shadowy manifestation of the real prophet. The Lahore Ahmadiyya consider Ahmad to be a mujaddid, reformer, Jesus and Mahdi.¹³ Although the Lahore faction did not claim prophethood over Ahmad, the majority of Muslims regarded the Qadianis as the same. This is because Ahmad himself in some of his writings claimed to be a prophet.¹⁴

Another Ahmadi doctrine is that of the caliph. As understood by Muslims regarding the caliph, the successor to the leadership after the Prophet died. Ahmadiyya adopted the concept known as Khalifatullah al-Masih, the caliph or leader after Mirza Ghulam Ahmad died. The caliph is elected by prominent Ahmadiyya figures to lead the Ahmadiyya community whose members are spread across several different countries. The elected Caliph becomes the centre of leadership over each Amir or leader in each country. Ahmadis believe that the Caliph is the successor of the Mahdi who is responsible for continuing the tradition of Ahmadiyya teachings as well as protecting the uprising members of the Ahmadiyya community, and consider that the Caliph is part of the chain that continues the teaching tradition of the Prophet as well as the Mahdi and Jesus the Messiah whose orders must be followed. There were five Caliphs of Ahmadiyya during the 100 years after the death of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. Among them:¹⁵

1. Hadhrat Hakim Maulana Nuruddin, Khalifatul Masih I, 27 May 1908 - 13 March 1914.
2. Hadhrat Alhaj Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmood Ahmad, Khalifatul Masih II, 14 March 1914 - 7 November 1965.
3. Hadhrat Hafiz Mirza Nasir Ahmad, Khalifatul Masih III, 8 November 1965 - 9 June 1982.
4. Hadhrat Mirza Tahir Ahmad, Khalifatul Masih IV, 10 June 1982 - 19 April 2003.
5. Hadhrat Mirza Masroor Ahmad, Khalifatul Masih V, 22 April 2003 - until now.

In addition to the doctrine of khalifatullah Masih, they believe that London is the centre of Islamic revival and that the book of Tazkirah is a revelation that came from God to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. For Ahmadiyya followers, the large number of Ahmadiyya congregations in London is not a coincidence. London is considered the centre of the future Islamic revival. In London there is a television channel called MTA (Muslim Television Ahmadiyya). The broadcast is active for 24 hours and broadcast to 200 countries in the world. The MTA is claimed to be the sun rising from the West, which is in accordance with the prophecy of the Prophet Muhammad that at the end of time the sun will rise from the West. While the

¹³ Maulana, Muhammad Hafiz Sher, *True Fact about the Ahmadiyya Movement*.

¹⁴ Osman, Mohamed Nawab Bin Mohamed, "Ahmadiyahs in Indonesia: Between Sensitivity and Diversity."

¹⁵ Erni Budiwanti, "Pluralism Collapses: A Study of the Jama'Ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and Its Persecution," *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2009, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1645144>.

Tazkira book is a book that contains predictions of the glory of Islam that will be realised in the next 300 years, and several statements regarding the teachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. The book consists of various languages, namely Arabic, Urdu, English, French, and Indian.¹⁶ The doctrines and beliefs of the two Ahmadiyya sects are as follows table 1.¹⁷

Table . The Doctrines And Beliefs of the Two Ahmadiyya

No	Ahmadiyya Lahore	Ahmadiyya Qadiyan
1	Muhammad (SAW) is <i>Khātām al-Nabiyyīn</i> , which is interpreted as he is the honourable one and the Seal of all prophets.	Muhammad (SAW) is <i>Khātām al-Nabiyyīn</i> , which interpretation is he is the noble though not the closure of the prophets.
2	The Qur'an is the Shari'ah that has been completed in the world.	Same
3	No prophet, after Prophet Muhammad	There are prophets after Prophet Muhammad
4	Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is the mujaddid (reformer) and the promised Masih and Mahdi in Islam.	Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is the prophet as well as the Messiah and al- Mahdi in Islam.
5	Mirza Ghulam Ahmad never changed his claims, such as his views and definition of prophethood in 1901 which has been published in <i>Ek Ghalati ka Izala</i>	His first writings that evidence a change in belief about prophethood are contained in <i>Ek Ghalati ka Izala</i> .
6	Belief in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a mujaddid is not essential to being a Muslim, but it is necessary to accept him in upholding aprogressive Islam.	Belief in the mission of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet is essential to being a Muslim.
7	Anyone who declares the creed is a Muslim, not a kafir.	Anyone who does not believe in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet is akafir.
8	It is permissible to pray behind any Muslim imam as long as he does not call other Muslimsinfidels.	It is not permissible to pray behind the back of imams who do not know Mirza GhulamAhmad.
9	It is permissible to marry someone other than Ahmadiyya.	Marriage of with other than Ahmadiyya is notallowed.
10	After Prophet Muhammad, prophetic revelations had ceased, only <i>wilāyāt revelations</i> continued to take place. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's revelation was <i>awilāyat</i> revelation and nota <i>propheticrevelation</i> .	After Prophet Muhammad the prophetic revelation continued. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's revelation was propheticrevelation.
11	The pioneer of the Lahore sect was Maulana Muhammad Ali, M.A., LL.B. translator and interpreter of the Qur'an into English , a friend and disciple of Mirza GhulamAhmad.	The pioneer of the Qadiyani sect was Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad, the son of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.
12	Members of this sect refer to themselves as Ahamadis, and are also commonly known as Ahmadis or theLahore Ahmadis movement.	Members of this sect call themselves they with Ahmadis, but are generally known as Qadianis.

¹⁶ Nurul Djazimah, Arni Arni, and Maimanah Maimah, "Fenomena Aliran Keagamaan di Banjarmasin (Studi Kasus Ahmadiyah)," *TASHWIR* 1, no. 1 (September 18, 2014), <https://doi.org/10.18592/jt.v1i1.113>.

¹⁷ Maulana, Muhammad Hafiz Sher, *True Fact about the Ahmadiyya Movement*.

MUI Fatwa Decree in 1980

Prior to the 1980 fatwa on the prohibition of the Ahmadiyya sect in Indonesia, there were two such decrees in countries other than Indonesia. Rabithah A'lam al-Islami had banned the Ahmadiyya Qadiyani movement in April 1974, and the Malaysian government issued a fatwa on the ban in 1975.¹⁸ There are three main evidences that the Qadiyani Ahmadiyya sect undermines the principles of Islam: it claims a new prophethood, distorts the meaning of Qur'anic verses, and advocates a doctrine of jihad that is not applicable in modern times. Moreover, the Qadiyani sect publishes and disseminates erroneous versions of the Qur'an in various languages.¹⁹ For these reasons, the Rabithah A'lam al-Islami Conference issued five recommendations against the Qadiyani sect and one against other deviant Islamic sects.²⁰

After the conference, Rabithah intensified its campaign to protect other Muslim countries from the activities of the Ahmadiyya sect. Rabithah also massively disseminated the 1974 fatwa by using government diplomatic relations and the ulama network. It even organised public campaigns, seminars and conferences against Ahmadiyya and other deviant sects, including Shi'ism. As well as publishing books and translating them in various languages about Ahmadiyya, including into Indonesian. Rabithah's entry into Indonesia through the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII), which at the time was under the leadership of Muhammad Natsir, was also active in countering the Ahmadiyya and Christianisation movements through the journal *Media Dakwah*. The 1974 fatwa organised by Rabithah had far-reaching implications in Muslim countries, including Indonesia.

¹⁸ According to Lilik Rofoqoh, in the first year of MUI's establishment, the institution was preoccupied with administrative issues, basic policies, and funding. In addition, MUI made efforts to introduce its existence through the Islamic Brotherhood Commission which was set to hold various meetings with all leaders of national Muslim organisations, as well as Muslim figures. Even this commission established co-operation with Muslims all over the world. In that first year, MUI's discussion has not touched on the aspect of differences in religious doctrines. For example, at the plenary meeting on 18 November 1975, the Fatwa Commission discussed several themes, including drugs, holidays during the fasting month, petasa, simple life and the government as a pioneer of worship activities. Rofiqoh, Lilik, "The Fatwas of Majelis Ulama Indonesia on the Ahmadiyah Doctrines," *Asia Pacific Journal on Religion and Society* 5, no. 1 (2021).

¹⁹ Ropi, "Islamism, Government Regulation, and the Ahmadiyah Controversies in Indonesia."

²⁰ Bunyi keputusan tersebut adalah sebagai berikut: (1) All the Muslim orgaization in the world must keep a vigilant eye on all the activities of Qadianis in their respective countries; to confine them all strictly to their schools, institutions and orphanages only. Moreover the Muslim of the world be aware of the true picture of Qadianism and be briefly of their various tactics so that the Muslims of the world be saved from their designs; (2) They must be declared non Muslims and ousted from the fold of Islam. And be barred to enter the Holy lands; (3) There must be no any dealing with the Qadianis. They must be boycotted socially, economically and culturally. Nor any marriage with or to. Nor they are allowed to be buried in the Muslim graveyards. And they are treated like other non Muslims; (4) All the Muslim countries must impose restrictions on the activities of the claimant of the prophecy of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani's followers; must declare them a non Muslim minority; must not entrust them with any post of responsibility in any Muslim cuntry; (5) The alterations effected by them in Holy Qur'an must be made public and the people be briefed of them and all these be prohibited for further publication; (6) all such groups as are deviators from Islam must be treated at par with the Qadianis.

Therefore, it is reasonable for the discussion to be considered by MUI in discussing the fatwa on Ahmadiyah.²¹

According to Lilik Rofiqoh, in Indonesia, the beginning of the discussion about Ahmadiyah doctrine was in 1979. In that year the Ministry of Religious Affairs issued instructions to the Director General of Bimas and Hajj Implementation, the Head of the Research and Development Agency of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Inspectorate General, and the Head of the Provincial Ministry of Religious Affairs to supervise the activities of Islamic organisations and the thoughts of sects that are contrary to Islamic doctrine. These four leaders were ordered to cooperate with the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN), MUI, and all Islamic institutions to monitor these matters. The instruction then raises the issue of Ahmadiyah doctrine. The doctrine of Ahmadiyah was then discussed and determined at the National Conference II of MUI on 26 May-1 June 1980.²² The fatwa was signed by three of the most authoritative people in the national MUI. These three people included Hamka as Chairman of the Leadership Council, the Secretary and Minister of Religious Affairs, Drs. H. Kafrawi, and Alamsjah Ratu Prawiranegara who at that time served as Chairman of the Advisory Council.²³

The fatwa issued in 1980 is very simple. It contained an introduction and dictum. The introduction consists of three things, namely "considering", "listening" and "observing". The dictum contains the content of the fatwa. In the 'considering' section, although it mentions its source from the Qur'an and Hadith, it does not include specific Qur'anic and Hadith verses. The 'listening' section includes President Soeharto's speech, Hamka's introduction and Shukri Ghazali's speech as Chairman of the Fatwa Commission. Then the next section is "observing". This section contains the report of Commission II at the national meeting, as well as suggestions from participants based on nine books-although the titles and authors are not mentioned-of the Qadiyani Ahmadiyya faith. From this introduction, two things come out in the dictum.²⁴ The first point, MUI decided that the sect had deviated from Islamic teachings.²⁵ The second point, MUI requested the state to implement the fatwa and asked religious officials at any level to disseminate it. After the issuance of the MUI fatwa, the government does not seem to strictly prohibit this Ahmadiyya sect. In fact, because of this indecisiveness, there was a push from the government of Saudi Arabia to ask the Indonesian government to ban the spread of Ahmadiyah.²⁶

This indecisiveness prompted the issuance of a recommendation on the prohibition of Ahmadiyah doctrine in 1984. The Minister of Religious Affairs, who at that time was held by Munawir Sadzali, discussed the deviation of Ahmadiyah Qadiyani in the National

See <http://alhafiez.org/rashid/rabita.html> accessed on 25 August 2000.

²¹ Ropi, "Islamism, Government Regulation, and the Ahmadiyah Controversies in Indonesia."

²² Lilik Rofiqoh, "THE MUI'S VIEW ON AHMADIYAH AND THE DISPUTE SURROUNDING IT," *De Jure: Jurnal Hukum Dan Syar'iah* 2, no. 1 (June 1, 2010), <https://doi.org/10.18860/j-fsh.v2i1.53>.

²³ Rofiqoh, Lilik, "The Fatwas of Majelis Ulama Indonesia on the Ahmadiyah Doctrines."

²⁴ Rofiqoh, Lilik.

²⁵ Ropi, "Islamism, Government Regulation, and the Ahmadiyah Controversies in Indonesia."

²⁶ Luthfi Assyaukanie, "Fatwa and Violence in Indonesia," *Journal of Religion*, 2009.

Working Meeting in 1984. The discussion then encouraged MUI to issue a Recommendation related to the prohibition of Ahmadiyah and Shi'ah. Unlike the 1980 MUI fatwa, the Recommendation mentioned the Minister of Justice's decision on the status of Ahmadiyah Qadiyani which was heretical and had caused unrest, social disintegration, and even endangered social stability and state security.²⁷

MUI Decree in 2005

The fatwa issued in 2005 was not just a confirmation of the previous fatwa, which at that time the Ahmadiyah sect became a controversial and disturbing issue.²⁸ However, there is a comprehensive prohibition and decree against Ahmadiyya adherents. If the MUI fatwa in 1980 only banned the Qadiani Ahmadiyya, then the 2005 fatwa decided that the Lahore Ahmadiyya was also a heretical and misleading sect.

The decision is the result of clarification, consideration, and in-depth research by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI). In the MUI National Conference held on 26-29 July 2005,²⁹ MUI considers that the Ahmadiyah sect continues to spread its teachings, even though its existence has been clearly prohibited. Starting from the spread and development of its understanding, until it causes unrest among the community. Then there are some people who ask for the reaffirmation of MUI's fatwa related to this sect because it causes various reactions and opinions among the community, as well as to fulfil the demands of the community and maintain the purity of Islamic aqidah. These considerations are the things that underlie the re-establishment of MUI fatwa related to Ahmadiyah.³⁰

The bases used in deciding the fatwa are Surah al-Ahzab/33: 40, al-An'am/6: 153, al-Mā'idah/5: 10 along with two hadiths narrated by Bukhari and Tirmidhi. The first hadith reads: *قال رسول الله ﷺ: بعدى نبي ال : وسلم عليه هلا صلى هلا رسول قال* "The Messenger of Allah said: There will be no prophet after me" (Al-Bukhārī). The second hadith is *ان : وسلم عليه هلا صلى هلا رسول قال* "The Messenger of Allah said: "Apostleship and prophethood have been cut off; therefore, there will be no apostle and no prophet after me" (HR. Tirmizī).³¹

Regarding the basis for the ruling in Surah al-Ahzab verse 40, the asbab an-nuzul based on information from Muhammad ibn 'Imarah is about Zaid ibn Harithah. The verse responds to Zaid's status as the adopted son of the Prophet. Based on this revelation, the

²⁷ Rofiqoh, "THE MUI'S VIEW ON AHMADIYAH AND THE DISPUTE SURROUNDING IT."

²⁸ The conflict involving Ahmadiyya began in 2001 over differences in religious understanding between Ahmadiyya and the majority Muslim religious groups in Indonesia.. Zainul Mun'im, "Argumen Fatwa MUI Tentang Kelompok Dan Paham Menyimpang 1994-2011; Perspektif Hukum Islam Dan Hak Asasi Manusia" (Disertasi, Jakarta, Sekolah Pascasarjana UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2016).

²⁹ "Fatwa MUI Nomor 11/MUNAS VII/MUI/15/2005 Tentang Ahmadiyah," n.d.

³⁰ "Fatwa MUI Nomor 11/MUNAS VII/MUI/15/2005 Tentang Ahmadiyah."

³¹ "Fatwa MUI Nomor 11/MUNAS VII/MUI/15/2005 Tentang Ahmadiyah."

Prophet was not prohibited from marrying Zayd's ex-wife, as he was not Zayd's father. However, he is the last prophet and there is no prophet after Prophet Muhammad.

The verse also contains different readings, namely on the lafaz خاتم النبيين. The Imams of Qira'at except Hasan and 'Ashim read the letter 'ta' in the word خاتم as bracketed. Hasan and 'Ashim, on the other hand, read the word as dipathised. The Qadiyaniyyah Ahmadiyya believe that the words khātam and khātim are different. According to them, khātim means the last, while khātam means a seal, stamp or seal. Based on this understanding, the Qadyani believe that Prophet Muhammad was the bearer of the great revelation, and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was also a prophet after him.³² As in their explanation;

"Khatam comes from the word khatama, which means to stamp, stamp, certify, or print on an item. This is the essence of the word. The second meaning is that it reaches the end of the thing, or covers the thing, or protects what is written by marking it or putting a piece of clay on it or with a stamp of any kind. Khatam also means a seal ring, a seal, or a stamp or a mark, the end or last part and result or offspring of a thing. The word also means the best or most perfect decoration or adornment. The words khātim, khatm, khātam al-nabiyyīn are similar in meaning. So the word khatam an-nabiyyīn would mean the seal of the best and most perfect of the Prophets."³³

This view is certainly contrary to the MUI who understands the word to mean "the Seal of the Prophets", and is an affirmation that there are no prophets and messengers after Prophet Muhammad.

Aṭ-Ṭabārī explains several narrations regarding Surah al- An'ām verse 153. One of them comes from Ibn 'Abbās who states that Muslims should stick to their religion and not divide it. This command corresponds to the Qur'an which states that Allah commands His servants to follow the congregation and forbids dividing it and disputing. He informs us that his previous servants were destroyed because of disputes and enmity in the religion of Allah. Another narration from Ibn Zayd states that the meaning of سبيله and صراطه is Islam, so there is nothing worth following other than Islam.

Then Surah al-Mā'idah verse 105 explains that Allah commands His servants to improve themselves and do good deeds as much as possible because people who always improve themselves will avoid evil and misguidance. While aṭ-Ṭabaṭabā'i states that the verse commands believers to always be in the way of Allah.

Regarding the hadith on which it is based, a hadith narrated by al-Bukhārī, the hadith in the word "ba'd" is interpreted by Ahmadiyya Qadiyani to mean "comparable". Moreover, according to Qadiyani, the words "lā nabiyya ba'd" in the hadith mean that no prophet can

³² Saifuddin, "Legal Opinion (Fatwa) of MUI (Council of Indonesian Ulama) on Ahmadiyah," *Az-Zarqa* 4, no. 2 (2012).

³³ Muchlis M Hanafi, *Menggugat Ahmadiyah; Mengungkap Ayat-Ayat Kontroversial Dalam Tafsir Ahmadiyah* (Jakarta: Lentera Hati, n.d.).

replace Prophet Muhammad as *khātam an-nabiyyīn*. The prophets who came after him were merely successors who did not have the function of bringing new laws.³⁴

In addition to using arguments from the sources of Islamic law, MUI also considers the fatwa of MUI National Conference II in 1980 on Ahmadiyah Qadiyaniyah, the opinion of Commission C Fatwa Session at MUI National Conference VII in 2005, as well as the decision of *Majma' al-Fiqh al-Islami* of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference Number 4 (4/2) in the Second Congress in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on 10-16 *Rabī' ath-Thāni* 1406 H/ 22-28 December 1985 M concerning the Qadiyaniyah sect. The decision of the Second Congress contained:

"Indeed, what Mirza Ghulam Ahmad claimed about his prophethood, about the message he carried and about the revelation that was sent down to him is a clear denial of the religious teachings that are known to be *qath'i* (certain) and convincing in the teachings of Islam, namely that Muhammad the Messenger of Allah is the last Prophet and Messenger and there will be no more revelations that will be sent down to anyone after that. Such beliefs as those taught by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad led him and his followers to become apostates, leaving Islam. The Qadiyaniyah sect and the Lahoriyah sect are the same, although the latter (lahoriyah) believes that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was merely a shadow and extension of the Prophet Muhammad."³⁵

The decision above makes it clear that not only is the Qadiyani sect heretical and misleading, but so is the Lahore sect. MUI is of the view that although these two sects are different, they agree on several points. Among them are that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is *al-Mahdi al-Mau'ūd* and *al-Masīh al-Mau'ūd*, Mirza received a revelation that must be justified by all humans, and both groups have the "concept of prophethood" of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad even though the explanation is different, what is preached, written and spoken is the truth, and those who deny and deny the preaching of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad are disbelievers. This view is in line with Mustafa Ya'qub's opinion regarding the indications of Ahmadiyya heresy. He stated that both the Qadiyan and Lahore sects were heretical in terms of beliefs and *aqidah* that were not in accordance with the *Qur'an* and *as-Sunnah*. That is, believing in the revelation after the *Qur'an*, interpreting the *Qur'an* by ignoring the rules of interpretation, and denying the Prophet Muhammad as the last Prophet, as well as disbelieving groups that are not in accordance with the understanding of the sect.³⁶

Based on deep consideration and based on authoritative arguments, MUI in the dictum "Decide": (1) to reaffirm MUI's fatwa in National Conference II Year 1980 which stipulates that Ahmadiyah Sect is outside Islam, heretical and misleading, and Muslims who follow it are apostates (out of Islam). (2) For those who have already followed the Ahmadiyya Sect to immediately return to the teachings of Islam *haq* (*al-rujū' ila al-haq*), which is in line with the *Qur'an* and *al-Hadith*. (3) The government is obliged to prohibit the spread of

³⁴ "Legal Opinion (Fatwa) of MUI (Council of Indonesian Ulama') on Ahmadiyah."

³⁵ "Fatwa MUI Nomor 11/MUNAS VII/MUI/15/2005 Tentang Ahmadiyah."

³⁶ Sajari, "FATWA MUI TENTANG ALIRAN SESAT DI INDONESIA (1976-2010)."

Ahmadiyya ideology throughout Indonesia and freeze the organisation and close all its activities.³⁷

In the following year, 2007, MUI formulated ten indicators of heretical teachings or sects. This was formulated in the MUI Rakernas in Sari van Pasific Hotel Jakarta. The ten formulations include; denying one of the six pillars of Faith and the five pillars of Islam; believing and or following aqidah that is not in accordance with the Qur'an and Sunnah; believing in the revelation after the Qur'an; denying the authenticity and or the truth of the contents of the Qur'an; interpreting the Qur'an that is not based on the rules of interpretation; denying the position of the Hadith of the Prophet SAW. as a source of Islamic teachings; insulting, harassing and or denigrating the prophets and apostles; denying the Prophet Muhammad SAW. as the last prophet and apostle; changing and or reducing the main points of worship that have been determined by shari'ah, such as hajj to the Temple and mandatory prayers are not five times; and disbelieving others without shar'i arguments, such as disbelieving Muslims just because they are not his group.³⁸

The fatwa that was issued twice shows that MUI is very intense in monitoring this Ahmadiyah movement. And not only MUI responds to the sect, some other Islamic groups also respond. This is evident from the fatwas against Ahmadiyah in Indonesia since 1929. The following is data on the response to Ahmadiyah in table 2.³⁹

Table 2. Response to Ahmadiyah

Year	Fatwa
1929	Muhammadiyah Fatwa which states that there is no prophet after Prophet Muhammad and if there is someone who claimsthere is, then kafir. ⁴⁰
1965	Fatwa Ulama West Sumatra 1965 against Qadiyani Ahmadiyya.
1980	Fatwa MUI North Sumatra 1980 on Ahmadiyah.
1984	MUI Fatwa Aceh 1984 against Ahmadiyah Qadiyani.
1994	Fatwa MUI Riau 1994 on Ahmadiyah Qadiyani.
20 October1994	Fatwa MUI Riau 1994 on Ahmadiyah Qadiyani.
1995	Fatwa of Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah Indonesia (FUUI) on Ahmadiyah Qadiyani
July 2005	Fatwa Syuriyah Pengurus Pusat Nahdhatul Ulama 1995 on Ahmadiyah.
November 2007	Fatwa on MUI 11/MUNAS VII/MUI/15/2005 on Ahmadiyah.

³⁷ MUI Fatwa Number 11/MUNAS VII/MUI/15/2005 on Ahmadiyah. According to Tobibatussaadah in his dissertation, the MUI fatwa decision shows the firmness of MUI to reject the Ahmadiyah sect. This can be seen from the fatwa that affirms the government to be directly involved in prohibiting the spread of the sect and freezing all its activities. This is because the sect has experienced a development that disturbs the community, whereas previously it was determined by the MUI fatwa in 1980 which prohibited the Ahmadiyah sect. This 2005 fatwa decision, according to Tobibatussaadah, was quite successful in stemming the spread of this sect, because it was able to involve the government to implement the fatwa. Tobibatussaadah, "Fatwa-fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2005; Otoritas Keagamaan Versus Liberalisasi Pemikiran Islam Pasca Orde Baru" (Disertation, Jakarta, Sekolah Pascasarjana UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2009).

³⁸ November 6, 2007, www.nu.or.id/post/read/10437/mui-tetapkan-10-indikator-aliran-sesat.

³⁹ Crouch, "Indonesia, Militant Islam and Ahmadiyah: Origins and Implications."

⁴⁰ Tim Peneliti, *Himpunan Putusan Majelis Tarjih*, III, n.d.

The Dilemma of Religious Freedom: Addressing Discrimination Against Ahmadiyya

Although MUI's fatwa is non-binding, it has considerable influence in Indonesian society.⁴¹ This influence caused MUI's fatwa on Ahmadiyah in 2005 to create a religious dilemma in Indonesia. On the one hand, MUI gave certainty to the public's concern about the doctrine and development of Ahmadiyah understanding. On the other hand, people's freedom of thought seems to be constrained and various discriminatory responses to this minority group seem to have legitimacy from the fatwa. Although as explained by Ahmad Muhsin that MUI Fatwa only provides an explanation of Ahmadiyah deviation and there is no element to encourage violence against this group. However, excessive response to Ahmadiyah is inevitable.⁴²

A series of attacks against Ahmadiyah occurred in several areas such as in Kuningan, Cikeusik, Garut, Tasikmalaya, Lombok and several other areas is a form of discrimination experienced by Ahmadiyah. The response to this discrimination is also seen from several campaigns of GAI (Indonesian Ahmadiyah Movement) in various official media that they use such as websites, discussions, books, and personal opinions. The topics campaigned are related to the differences between GAI and JAI (Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation), the discourse of religious freedom, the social discrimination they experience, and the promotion of a peaceful movement. In particular, the GAI argued that the physical and social attacks against the Ahmadiyah marked a desecration of religious freedom and a negative action against Pancasila and the Indonesian Constitution.⁴³

The discrimination against JAI and GAI groups is a challenge in terms of freedom of religion and belief in Indonesia. This dilemmatic challenge is in fact not only faced by MUI, the state also seems confused to face the public response and violence against Ahmadiyah. On the one hand, the state is seen as not firm against Ahmadiyah's deviation. On the other hand, the state is considered often negligent in terms of intolerance and violence committed against Ahmadiyah so that the state is considered not neutral. Even according to Max Regus, the state is unable to provide political protection to this group and prefers the interests of the majority.⁴⁴ This non-neutral stance has in fact become the basis for other groups to carry out attacks on the basis of state and religious decisions. Nevertheless, the state has a concern for freedom of religion and belief as a human right. This can be seen in the opening of application to the Constitutional Court for individuals

⁴¹ Ahmad Fuad Fanani, "Shari'ah Bylaws in Indonesia and Their Implications for Religious Minorities," *JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM* 05, no. 01 (2011).

⁴² Ari Wibowo, "Studi Kritis terhadap Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia Nomor 11 Tahun 2005 tentang Aliran Ahmadiyah dan Kebijakan Negara dalam Penyelesaian Kasus Ahmadiyah," *Akademika: Jurnal pemikiran Islam* 18, no. 2 (2013), <https://e-journal.metrouniv.ac.id/akademika/article/view/400>.

⁴³ Andi Muhammad Irawan et al., "Arguing against Political and Religious Discriminations: Critical Discourse Analysis of Indonesian Ahmadiyya," *Muslim World Journal of Human Rights* 19, no. 1 (September 27, 2022): 53–76, <https://doi.org/10.1515/mwjhr-2021-0024>.

⁴⁴ Max Regus, "The Victimization of the Ahmadiyya Minority Group in Indonesia: Explaining the Justifications and Involved Actors," *Religious: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama Dan Lintas Budaya* 4, no. 4 (December 31, 2020): 227–38, <https://doi.org/10.15575/rjsalb.v4i4.10256>.

and groups who feel their rights have been violated.⁴⁵ Thus, the state needs to reconsider the concept of recognised or unrecognised religions, majorities and minorities.⁴⁶ Because of this concept, recognised minorities are accepted. However, unrecognised minorities become alienated and often face discrimination, violence and loss of citizenship rights. Thus, the government must be neutral and implement regulations and policies regarding minorities without direct pressure from the majority group. The interest of the majority group is not a requirement for a state decision.⁴⁷

CONCLUSION

This article concludes the fatwas issued by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) regarding the Ahmadiyya movement in Indonesia in 1980 and 2005. The 1980 fatwa specifically declared the Qadiyani Ahmadiyya as heretical and outside of Islam, while the 2005 fatwa covered both the Qadiyani and Lahore Ahmadiyya sects. The fatwas were based on Quranic verses, hadith, and decisions of international Islamic bodies. The emergence of these fatwas illustrates the rejection and intense monitoring of the Ahmadiyya religious movement in Indonesia.

The factors leading to the issuance of the fatwas include the influence of Rabithah through the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII), recommendations from the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1979 to supervise Ahmadiyya and other deviant religious sects, the government's indecisiveness in dealing with the Qadiyani Ahmadiyya heresy, unrest in the community, and the similarity of Ahmadiyya Lahore doctrine to Qadiyani doctrine. The fatwas, although not legally binding, have had a significant influence on Indonesian society, leading to a dilemma between religious freedom and discrimination against the Ahmadiyya minority group. The state has faced challenges in balancing the demands of the majority and protecting the rights of religious minorities.

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⁴⁵ Deasy Simandjuntak, "Disciplining the Accepted and Amputating the Deviants: Religious Nationalism and Segregated Citizenship in Indonesia," *Asian Journal of Law and Society* 8, no. 1 (February 2021): 88–107, <https://doi.org/10.1017/als.2020.49>.

⁴⁶ Nicola Colbran, "Realities and Challenges in Realising Freedom of Religion or Belief in Indonesia," *The International Journal of Human Rights* 14, no. 5 (September 2010): 678–704, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13642980903155166>.

⁴⁷ Michael Buehler, "Do Discriminatory Laws Have Societal Origins? The Diffusion of Anti-Ahmadiyah Regulations in Indonesia," *Politics and Religion* 16, no. 3 (September 2023): 468–91, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048323000081>.

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